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Introduction
Although acting in the moment satisfies many of our pri-
mary needs, important achievements—such as constructing 
the pyramids or landing on the moon—involve the capac-
ity to represent things that could be the case, allowing the 
generation of a series of steps that can make imagined sce-
narios come about. Several important positive and nega-
tive outcomes have been linked to elements of experience 
(Kane et al. 2007), behaviour (Flehmig et al. 2007) and 
neural functioning (Smith et al. 2015) that are independent 
of environmental input; nevertheless, the real-world signifi-
cance of the different aspects of the cognition that we gen-
erate in our idle moments remains largely unexplored.
One adaptive value we might derive from the capacity 
to self-generate thought unrelated to the task in hand is 
the chance to make progress on problems that we cannot 
act on immediately. As a species, we devote a substantial 
amount of our free time to thinking about the future: expe-
rience-sampling studies have identified a prospective bias 
in naturally occurring thoughts across many different cul-
tures (Baird et al. 2011; Stawarczyk et al. 2011; Song and 
Wang 2012; Ruby et al. 2013). Although these studies show 
that future-oriented thought is common during the mind-
wandering state, they do not explain whether this leads to 
more effective plans and if so what mechanism underlies 
this change. It is possible that prospective thoughts could 
help refine strategies for achieving personal goals, a pro-
cess that would be adaptive if it allowed future actions 
to be specified in greater detail (Gollwitzer and Sheeran 
2006). Prior work has shown inconsistent evidence that 
tasks that encourage stimulus-independent thought increase 
the chance that a novel solution to an old problem will be 
generated through a process of incubation (Baird et al. 
2012; Smeekens and Kane 2016); however, as incubation 
Abstract Human cognition is not limited to the available 
environmental input but can consider realities that are dif-
ferent to the here and now. We describe the cognitive states 
and neural processes linked to the refinement of descrip-
tions of personal goals. When personal goals became con-
crete, participants reported greater thoughts about the self 
and the future during mind-wandering. This pattern was not 
observed for descriptions of TV programmes. Connectiv-
ity analysis of participants who underwent a resting-state 
functional magnetic resonance imaging scan revealed neu-
ral traits associated with this pattern. Strong hippocampal 
connectivity with ventromedial pre-frontal cortex was com-
mon to better-specified descriptions of goals and TV pro-
grammes, while connectivity between hippocampus and the 
pre-supplementary motor area was associated with individ-
uals whose goals were initially abstract but became more 
concrete over the course of the experiment. We conclude 
that self-generated cognition that arises during the mind-
wandering state can allow goals to be refined, and this 
depends on neural systems anchored in the hippocampus.
Keywords Mind-wandering · Goals · Future thought · 
Hippocampus
 * Jonathan Smallwood 
 jonny.smallwood@york.ac.uk
1
 Department of Psychology, York Neuroimaging Centre, 
University of York, Heslington, York, UK
2
 Neuroanatomy and Connectivity Group, Max Planck Institute 
for Human and Cognitive Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
3
 Neuroimaging of Epilepsy Lab, Montreal Neurological 
Institute, McGill University, Quebec, Canada
4
 Neuroimaging Laboratory, IRCCS Santa Lucia Foundation, 
Rome, Italy
2470 Exp Brain Res (2018) 236:2469–2481
1 3
is assumed to be largely unconscious (Smith and Blanken-
ship 1991), this does not explain the benefits we may gain 
from devoting conscious thought to a problem. The current 
experiment examined the hypothesis that future-focussed 
thought during mind-wandering helps us generate the steps 
we should take to achieve important personal goals.
 We also hoped to understand the structure of sponta-
neous neurocognitive activity that underpins the process 
through which people make plans for the future. The 
medial temporal lobe system, and in particular the hip-
pocampus, is a plausible candidate neural system for 
allowing us to form more concrete plans for the future. 
Lesion studies and functional imaging work have docu-
mented that the hippocampus is important in forming new 
memories with high levels of episodic detail (Eichenbaum 
1993; Aggleton and Brown 1999), as well as the retrieval 
of these memories in the service of constructing imag-
ined scenes (for reviews, see Buckner and Carroll 2007; 
Schacter et al. 2007; Hassabis and Maguire 2009). In 
both contexts, the hippocampus forms a cohesive network 
with other regions such as the ventromedial pre-frontal 
cortex that bind together different elements of scenes 
to form holistic representations of episodes (Marr et al. 
1991; McClelland et al. 1995; Dickerson and Eichenbaum 
2010). The role of the hippocampus in making predic-
tions using imagination is known as the prospective con-
solidation hypothesis, emphasising that prior experiences 
are crystallised in long-term memory with the aim of 
making better predictions of what may happen (Buckner 
2010; Smallwood 2013). By providing a mechanism that 
encodes events into memory, as well as generating simu-
lations of what may occur in the future based on represen-
tations of what has already happened, the hippocampus 
could be important in developing descriptions of personal 
goals in the absence of being able to immediately act 
upon them.
The current study examined the experiential and neu-
ral basis of the capacity to transform personal goals into a 
series of concrete steps that can generate specific actions 
and compared this with the development of descriptions 
generated from memory but not linked to goals (descrip-
tions of familiar TV programmes). We chose TV pro-
grammes as control since it would provide memorial 
information that was familiar but not personally relevant. 
We used resting-state functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) to characterise the intrinsic architecture of the 
hippocampus in a sample of healthy participants. In a sub-
sequent laboratory session, participants first completed 
a baseline session of an undemanding task in which the 
contents of the thoughts that emerge during mind-wan-
dering was assessed. Next, they were allocated to spend 
15 min either writing descriptions of three personal goals, 
or three TV programmes on a computer. After completing 
this section of the experiment, the participants performed a 
second session of the mind-wandering task. Finally, partici-
pants repeated the written description task for goals or TV 
programmes that they had performed previously. We meas-
ured the content and form of the thoughts that emerged dur-
ing mind-wandering using multidimensional experience 
sampling (MDES, see Smallwood et al. 2016). The writ-
ten transcripts were rated along a number of dimensions 
including their temporal focus, their emotional qualities 
and their levels of concrete detail. This design is described 
schematically in Fig. 1.
We examined two aspects of the data relevant to 
how we specify our goals using imagination. First, if 
the tendency to engage in prospective thought during 
mind-wandering is implicated in the generation of more 
concrete goals, then during the mind-wandering task, 
future thinking should change in tandem with beneficial 
changes in goal descriptions; for example, there might 
be increases in the level of detail that these goals contain 
(Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006). Second, if this tendency 
to refine personal goals depends on a brain network that 
includes the hippocampus, then individual differences in 
goal descriptions should predict its functional connectiv-
ity profile; for example, the strength of its connection to 
regions involved in action selection or decision-making. 
In contrast, trait variability in the strength of functional 
connectivity between hippocampus and areas implicated 
in the control of action should not predict individual dif-
ferences in the ability to specify greater detail about TV 
programmes.
Methods
Participants
One hundred participants (26 males, age mean = 20 years; 
age SD = 1.72) were recruited using an Electronic Experi-
ment Booking System at the University of York. Approval 
was granted by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology 
Department and York Neuroimaging Centre. In a subset of 
participants (n = 42, 13 males, age mean 20.4 years, age 
SD = 1.72, 23 participated in the goals condition), high-
resolution functional and structural MRI data were avail-
able (obtained on average 3 days before the behavioural 
testing study). The investigation was in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki, and all participants provided writ-
ten informed consent. Participants received a payment of 
£20 or a commensurate amount of course credits for par-
ticipation. Participants who participated in the neuroimag-
ing element of the experiment received the same level of 
compensation for participating in this additional experi-
mental session. We decided on the sample size for this 
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experiment based on prior studies exploring similar ques-
tions (e.g. Baird et al. 2013; Ruby et al. 2013). Participants 
were recruited separately for the imaging and behavioural 
session. In this study, we also measured heart rate and 
blood pressure; however, these data will be reported else-
where. We report how we determined our sample size, all 
data exclusions (if any), all manipulations and all measures 
in the study.
Behavioural session
Experimental procedure
The procedure of the behavioural session is presented sche-
matically in Fig. 1. It began with a session in which par-
ticipants completed a cognitive task to provide a baseline 
measure of the content and form of spontaneous thought. 
Next, participants were allocated to write for 15 min on 
either three of their most important personal goals or to 
write for a similar period on three of their favourite TV 
programmes. After this period, all participants repeated the 
cognitive task allowing the content and form of spontane-
ous thought to be assessed on a second occasion. Finally, 
they were asked to write about the same topics allowing 
us to determine any changes in their representations of TV 
programmes or personal goals that had occurred over the 
delay period.
Cognitive task
We assessed experience in a variant of the task used by 
Konishi et al. (2015). The task alternates between a 0-back 
and a 1-back condition and was employed to provide a 
measure of experience during both the baseline and the 
experimental phases of the experiment. In both conditions, 
participants viewed different pairs of shapes (non-targets) 
appearing on the screen divided by a vertical line; the pairs 
could be: a circle and a square, a circle and a triangle, or 
a square and a triangle for a total of 6 possible pairs. In 
both tasks, a block of non-targets was followed by a tar-
get requiring participants to make a manual response. The 
target consisted of a small stimulus presented at the mid-
dle of the vertical line in either blue or red and the colour 
was counterbalanced across participants. In the 0-back 
condition, the target was flanked by one of two shapes 
and participants had to indicate by pressing the appropri-
ate button which shape matched the target shape. In the 
1-back condition, the target was flanked by two question 
marks and participants had to respond depending on which 
side the target shape was on the previous trial. Responses 
were made using the left and right arrow keys. Each block 
lasted between 40 and 120 s before switching to the other 
condition; the change of condition was signalled by a mes-
sage (“SWITCH”) that remained on screen for 5 s. On 
each trial, the number of non-targets preceding the targets 
Experience Sampling 1 Writing Session 1 Writing Session 2
Time
Baseline 
measure of the 
content and 
form of 
spontaneous 
thought
Describe 3 
personal goals 
or TV programs
Measure of the 
change in the 
content and 
form of 
spontaneous 
thought
Identify 
changes in 
descriptions of 
TV programs of 
Goals.
Experience Sampling 2
Fig. 1  Experimental protocol for the behavioural session. Partici-
pants performed a single laboratory session with four stages. The first 
stage was an externally focused task in which the content and form 
of their thoughts that occur during the mind-wandering state was 
assessed using experience sampling, providing a baseline measure of 
experience for each participant. Next, they were allocated to one of 
two conditions: (1) to write about either three personal goals or (2) 
to write about three of their favourite TV programmes for 15 min. 
Following this they repeated the cognitive task including the experi-
ence-sampling measures allowing the assessment of how experience 
changed. Finally, participants repeated the writing task
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varied between 2 and 6, the number of trials per block var-
ied between 2 and 5 and the total number of blocks was 
8 for each condition. The order of conditions was counter-
balanced across participants, and each session of the task 
lasted approximately 20 min. The total number of targets 
was 15–20 per condition per session (0-back and 1-back). 
Presentation rate of stimuli was jittered: fixation crosses 
ranged from 2 to 4 s in steps of 0.1 s; non-targets varied 
from 1 to 3 s in steps of 0.1 s. Targets were presented for a 
maximum of 4 s and were terminated by the participant’s 
response.
Multidimensional experience sampling (MDES)
The content of thought was measured using MDES: a tech-
nique that measures multiple different elements of experi-
ence as it occurs during the mind-wandering state with a 
specific focus on the patterns of covariance within the 
observed data (Ruby et al. 2013; Ruby et al. 2013; Engert 
et al. 2014; Gorgolewski et al. 2014). Participants were 
interrupted randomly during the task by thought probes 
asking participants a series of questions on the content of 
their experience in the moment immediately prior to the 
interruption. Participants received an average of 6 probes in 
each condition in each session. As is standard in our work 
(e.g. Ruby et al. 2013; Engert et al. 2014), we randomised 
the number of probes to ensure that a particular probing 
regime could influence the extent of mind-wandering that 
was reported. The questions were administered in a quasi-
random order with the first question always about task 
focus, followed by mini-blocks of questions examining the 
extent to which their thoughts involved future events, past 
events, themselves, or other people, images or words, and 
whether their thoughts were intrusive, vague and non-spe-
cific or detailed, and positively or negatively valanced. On 
each occasion, the order of each mini-block as well as the 
order of questions within each mini-block was randomised. 
Participants could rate their thoughts on a scale from 0 
(completely off-task) to 9 (completely on-task), except for 
the emotional content where they had to rate their thoughts 
on a scale between two extremes, from negative to positive. 
This procedure is consistent with prior studies using this 
approach (Ruby et al. 2013; Engert et al. 2014).
Writing task
Participants were randomly assigned to either the goals or 
TV program condition. In the goal condition, 51 partici-
pants were asked to choose three important personal goals 
in life. In the TV program condition, 49 choose three of 
their favourite TV programmes. In both the pre- and post-
sessions, each group was given 15 min to write about the 
allocated topic. Participants wrote their answers in a word 
document and were encouraged to use all of the time to 
write about their assigned topic. They were asked not to 
worry about punctuation or grammar. Participants were 
encouraged to be as sincere as possible. To facilitate an 
honest description of goals, participants were told that they 
did not need to provide identifying information. For exam-
ple, in the goal condition participants were told that if they 
were to write about a goal that involved a friends or relative 
they did not need to provide their real name. The partici-
pants were also reassured that their data would be treated 
anonymously.
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked 
what they thought the aim of the experiment was. Sixty-
five percentage of them thought it was something related 
to how TV programmes/goals affected thought content, 
performance or concentration, 18 % thought it was about 
mind-wandering/day-dreaming, 1 % thought it was on per-
sonality, 1 % on depression and mental health and 15 % 
had no idea. Importantly, no participants indicated that they 
expected to repeat the task of writing about either the TV 
programmes or their goals. Finally, participants were com-
pensated for their participation.
Transcript analysis
Two independent raters that were blind to experimental 
condition, the thoughts the participants reported during the 
study, the results of the functional connectivity analysis, 
and the aim of the experiment analysed transcripts from 
both groups. Raters were provided with the descriptions in 
Table 1 and were asked to rate the transcripts for each type 
of content on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (com-
pletely). To assess the reliability of the different rates, we 
calculated Cohen k which provides a good estimate of the 
degree to which two raters make consistent estimates of the 
same phenomenon (Cohen 1960). It represents the propor-
tion of agreement corrected by chance, and these are pre-
sented in Table 2. The average score for each category from 
the two raters was calculated and used in the subsequent 
analyses.
Neuroimaging session
In a subset of participants (n = 42, 13 males, age mean 
20.4 years, age SD = 1.72, 23 participated in the Goals 
condition), high-resolution functional and structural 
MRI data were available (obtained on average 3 days 
before the behavioural testing study). All MRI data 
were acquired at the York Neuroimaging Centre (YNIC) 
using a GE 3.0 Tesla Signa Excite HDx scanner using an 
eight-channel phased-array head coil. The session began 
with a 9-min resting-state fMRI scan, in which partici-
pants were asked to focus on a fixation cross. The blood 
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oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) fMRI time-series with 
fat saturation were acquired using a 9-min gradient single-
shot echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence [repetition time 
(TR) = 3000 ms, echo time (TE) = 19 ms, flip angle = 90°, 
matrix = 64 × 64, field of view (FOV) = 192 mm, 60 
slices with interleaved (bottom-up) acquisition order, 
slice thickness = 3 mm, voxel size = 3 × 3 × 3 mm, 
180 volumes]. Subsequently, we acquired high-resolution 
structural scans for each of the participants using an iso-
tropic 3D fast spoiled gradient-recalled echo (3D FSPGR) 
T1-weighted sequence (TR = 7.8 ms, TE = 3 ms, flip 
angle = 20°, matrix = 256 × 256, 176 sagittal slices with 
1 mm thickness, voxel size = 1.13 × 1.13 × 1 mm). To 
facilitate co-registrations, a high-resolution T1-weighted 
in-plane anatomical picture was also acquired for all par-
ticipants, using a fluid-attenuated inversion recovery (T1 
FLAIR).
fMRI pre‑processing
All fMRI pre-processing and analyses were performed 
using FSL. We extracted the brain from the skull using 
the BET toolbox for both the FLAIR and the structural 
T1-weighted images, and these scans were registered to 
standard space using FLIRT (Jenkinson and Smith 2001). 
Prior to conducting the functional connectivity analysis, 
the following pre-statistics processing was applied to the 
resting-state data; motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jen-
kinson et al. 2002); slice-timing correction using Fourier-
space time-series phase shifting; non-brain removal using 
BET (Smith 2002); spatial smoothing using a Gaussian 
kernel of FWHM 6 mm; grand-mean intensity normalisa-
tion of the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative fac-
tor; high-pass temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-
squares straight line fitting, with σ = 100 s); Gaussian low 
pass temporal filtering, with σ = 2.8 s.
First‑level analysis
Seed regions were based on anatomical masks of the left 
and right hippocampus in MNI152 space, derived from a 
recently published open-access data repository (Kulaga-
Yoskovitz et al. 2015). Average time-series of these masks 
were extracted and used as explanatory variables in a 
subject-wise functional connectivity analysis, which also 
included the following nuisance regressors: the first five 
principal time-series components extracted from white mat-
ter (WM) and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) masks in accord-
ance with the CompCor method (Behzadi et al. 2007) and 
six motion parameters. WM and CSF masks were gener-
ated by segmenting each individual’s high-resolution struc-
tural image (using FAST in FSL). The default tissue prob-
ability maps, referred to as prior probability maps (PPMs), 
were registered to each individual’s high-resolution struc-
tural image (T1 space), and the overlap between these PPM 
and the corresponding CSF and WM maps was identified. 
Finally, these maps were thresholded (40 % for the SCF 
and 66 % for the WM), binarized and combined. The six 
motion parameters were calculated in the motion-correc-
tion step during pre-processing. Linear displacements in 
each of the three Cartesian directions (x, y, z) and rota-
tions around three axes (pitch, yaw, roll) were included for 
each individual. No individual exceeded xyz-displacements 
>1 mm and rotations beyond 1°. No global signal regres-
sion was performed (Murphy et al. 2009).
Table 1  Categories for the 
analysis of the transcripts
Category Description
Future Refers to the future (e.g. uses the future tense)
Past Refers to the past (e.g. uses the past tense)
Self Refers to him/herself (e.g. uses first person pronoun)
Other Refers to other people (e.g. family, friends)
Positive The content is positive (e.g. expresses positive emotions)
Negative The content is negative (e.g. expresses negative emotions)
Concrete Focus on specific actions (e.g. a study schedule) or objects (e.g. money, books)
Abstract Focus on general goals (e.g. success) or abstract terms (i.e. freedom, equity)
Table 2  Mean (SD) for the ratings of the transcripts for the two ses-
sions
Session 1 Session 2 Agreement  
(Cohen)
Mean SD Mean SD
Past 2.0 0.6 2.0 0.6 .70
Future 2.1 1.1 2.2 1.1 .96
Positive 3.0 0.8 2.9 0.8 .90
Negative 2.2 0.6 2.3 0.6 .77
Self 3.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 .95
Other 2.8 0.8 2.9 0.9 .78
Abstract 3.1 0.7 3.1 0.6 .77
Concrete 3.0 0.7 3.0 0.5 .68
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Results
Behavioural performance
A mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) compared perfor-
mance (accuracy and RT) on the cognitive task used dur-
ing MDES. This analysis had two within-participant fac-
tors each with two levels: task (0-back/1-back) and session 
(first/second). Experimental group (goals/TV programmes) 
was included as a between participants variable. With 
respect to accuracy, the analysis revealed a main effect 
of task [F (1, 97) = 20.1, p < .001] with lower accuracy 
in the 1-back (mean = .92, SE = .01) than in the 0-back 
(mean = .97, SE = .01). Analysis of RT revealed a main 
effect of task [F (1, 97) = 110.9, p < .001] with slower 
responses in the 1-back (mean 1.08 s, SE = .02) than in 
the 0-back (mean = .98 s, SE = .02) and an effect of ses-
sion [F (1,97) = 5.6, p < .05] with longer response times 
in the first session (mean = 1.01 s, SE = .02) than in the 
second (mean = 0.98 s, SE = .02). It also revealed a task 
by session by group interaction [F (1, 97) = 8.5, p < .01]. 
We calculated the change in RT from the first to the sec-
ond session in each task and compared these scores across 
experimental groups using a MANOVA. This yielded an 
effect of experimental group on RT in the 0-back task [F 
(1, 97) = 5.42, p < .05] but no effect on RT in the 1-back 
task (p < .1). In the TV programmes condition, response 
times in the 0-back task were shorter in the second session 
[mean = .91 s (SE = .02)] than in the first [mean = .97 
(SE = .03), t (47) = 2.36, p < .05].
We used principal components analysis (PCA) with 
varimax rotation in SPSS to decompose the dimensional-
ity of both the experience-sampling data and the written 
descriptions.
Written descriptions
Table 2 presents the average ratings for the transcripts in 
each session. We calculated the change between initial and 
subsequent ratings for each participant for each dimension, 
creating a single vector that describes how different aspects 
of the participants’ descriptions changed over the course of 
the experiment. Applying PCA to this vector yielded four 
components that are presented as a heat map in the upper 
panel of Fig. 2. Factor solutions were selected with an 
eigenvalue >1. Component 1 describes changes in the level 
of concrete details of the description, accounting for 
approximately 23 % of the variance and with a positive 
weighting reflecting increases in concreteness.1 Component 
2 reflects an increased emphasis on the self versus other 
1
 In this decomposition, the weighting for C1 was negatively 
weighted on concreteness and positively related to abstractness. For 
simplicity of explanation, we present the reversed factor loading for 
this component in all subsequent analysis in which a positive score 
indicates that written descriptions became more concrete.
Fig. 2  Results of the decompo-
sition of the written descrip-
tions and experience-sampling 
data. Heat maps illustrating the 
results of decompositions using 
principal components analysis 
(PCA) for both the written 
descriptions (upper panel) and 
the experience-sampling data 
(lower panel). In both cases, 
varimax rotation was applied 
to the subsequent solutions. 
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people in the descriptions and accounted for 21 % of the 
overall variance. Component 3 reflects an increased empha-
sis on negative rather than positive aspects of the descrip-
tions for 18 % of the variance. Component 4 describes a 
change in the emphasis of the past relative to the future in 
the descriptions and accounts for 13 % of the overall vari-
ance. Subsequently, we projected these data back into sub-
ject space, allowing us to describe each individual in terms 
of how much they changed their descriptions along the 
dimensions that the decomposition procedure identified.
Multidimensional experience sampling
Table 3 presents the data from the experience-sampling 
probes separated by session. To ensure comparability with 
the prior investigation, we decomposed these data at the 
trial level, concatenating the data from each probing epi-
sode for each individual into a single matrix and applying 
PCA with varimax rotation. A decomposition with three 
orthogonal factors yielded solutions that are broadly con-
sistent with prior investigations (Ruby et al. 2013; Engert 
et al. 2014) (see lower left-hand panel of Fig. 2): (a) Future 
focused thoughts with a high weighting on thoughts about 
the self in the future, accounting for 36 % of the observed 
variance, (b) Past focused thoughts with a high weighting 
on thoughts about self and others in the past, accounting for 
18 % of the variance and (c) Task-related thoughts with a 
high weighting indicating positive task focused experiences 
and a low weighting indicating negative off-task experi-
ences, accounting for 18 % of the variance.
Our decomposition of the form of thoughts yielded three 
components, which can be seen in the left panel of Fig. 2: (a) 
The modality of the thoughts (images or words) with a high 
weighting reflecting thoughts that were described as words, 
accounting for 37 % of the variance, (b) The level of intru-
siveness in the thoughts with a high weighting indicating 
more intrusive thoughts, accounting for 25 % of the variance 
and (c) The level of detail in the thoughts, with a low weight-
ing indicating a higher level of detail, accounting for 25 % 
of the overall variance. The loadings for each component 
describing the content and form of thought are presented as 
heat maps in the lower right-hand panel of Fig. 2, and these 
components are consistent to a pattern revealed through simi-
lar decomposition process in two different data sets (Small-
wood et al. 2016). For the purpose of analysis, the six com-
ponents describing the content and form of spontaneous 
thoughts were averaged across the two MDES sessions (i.e. 
recorded before and after the initial description task, respec-
tively) for each participant. Finally, a change score was calcu-
lated by subtracting the component in the first MDES session 
from the component in the second MDES session. These data 
correspond to changes from baseline in particular aspects of 
spontaneous thought following the description task.
Relation between the change in descriptions 
and spontaneous thought during the mind-wandering task
To understand the relationship between the changes in the 
descriptions of the goals and the spontaneous thoughts that 
occurred during the mind-wandering task, we conducted a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). In this anal-
ysis, changes in the six components describing the content 
and form of thoughts were dependent variables, and the 
four components describing the change in the descriptions 
were entered as continuous independent variables. We also 
included the condition (goal/TV programmes) as a categori-
cal factor. We modelled the main effects of each factor and 
allowed each component to interact with the experimental 
condition. This MANOVA indicated a condition by concrete 
detail interaction [F (6, 84) = 2.7, p < 0.05] that was due to 
an association between thoughts about the self and future in 
the goal condition (r = 0.42, p < 0.005, 95 % CI lower = .10, 
upper = .65), but not the TV program condition (r = −0.16, 
p > 0.2, 95 % CI lower = −.47, upper = .16). Thus, when 
an opportunity for spontaneous thought led to an increase in 
the concreteness of personal goals, this change was related 
to increases in thoughts regarding the future across this 
period. Table 4 presents the zero-order correlations between 
the change in each type of spontaneous thought and each 
element of the written descriptions, and Fig. 3 illustrates 
the significant relationship between increasingly concrete 
descriptions of goals with future thinking. To assess whether 
this pattern replicated across the samples of participants who 
did and did not participate in the initial resting-state study, 
we calculated the correlation between increases in spontane-
ous future thinking and the changes in concrete goals sepa-
rately in the behavioural and fMRI samples. This identified 
a similar pattern in both groups (behaviour only, r = 0.38, 
p = 0.06, fMRI, r = 0.44, p < 0.05).
Table 3  Mean (SD) for the multidimensional experience sampling 
(MDES)
Question Session 1 Session 2
Mean SD Mean SD
Task .61 .24 .53 .27
Future .43 .28 .46 .28
Past .31 .25 .37 .28
Self .51 .27 .54 .26
Other .39 .29 .46 .29
Emotion .57 .18 .59 .18
Images .49 .27 .52 .27
Words .58 .28 .57 .26
Intrusive .36 .25 .37 .26
Detail .43 .27 .44 .27
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Finally, we explored whether the pattern linking change 
in the concreteness of goals was related to low levels of 
future thought in the baseline session, in the post-descrip-
tion session or both. We conducted two separate linear 
regressions with the change in concreteness as the depend-
ent variable and the loading on future thinking in sessions 
1 and 2 as independent variables. This model was run 
separately on the participants who participated in the goal 
and in the TV programme conditions. This revealed a sig-
nificant model for the goals condition [F (2, 48) = 5.02, 
p < .01] but not in the TV programmes condition [F (2, 
45) = .761, p = .47]. In the goal condition, the largest 
changes in the concreteness were associated with lower 
levels of future thinking in session 1 and higher levels in 
session 2 (see Table 5). This pattern indicates that increas-
ingly concrete goals were produced by individuals who 
produced low levels of future-related thoughts but subse-
quently increased these reports in the second session.
Relation to functional connectivity
Having identified that spontaneous thoughts about the future 
increase when an opportunity to engage in spontaneous 
Table 4  Zero-order correlations 
between the change in self-
generated thought and in 
descriptions of goals and TV 
programmes
C1, concrete; C2, self; C3, negative; C4, past
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Future Past Task Images Detail Intrusive
Entire sample
C1 0.18 −0.07 −0.15 0.05 0.11 0.08
C2 0.12 −0.01 −0.05 0.04 0.11 −0.04
C3 −0.02 −0.18 0.04 −0.05 0.12 −0.07
C4 −0.04 −0.07 0.10 −0.07 0.24 −0.14
Goals
C1 0.42** −0.08 −0.07 0.12 −0.04 0.17
C2 0.14 0.00 −0.16 0.07 0.06 0.02
C3 −0.08 −0.19 −0.08 −0.16 0.27* −0.16
C4 −0.08 −0.11 0.21 −0.07 0.25 −0.11
TV programmes
C1 −0.16 −0.05 −0.23 0.00 0.27 0.00
C2 0.09 −0.02 0.03 0.03 0.15 −0.09
C3 0.13 −0.16 0.15 0.07 −0.11 0.08
C4 0.07 0.01 −0.05 −0.09 0.24 −0.17
Goals TV
∆ 
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Fig. 3  Identification of the relationship between changes in experi-
ential characteristics from baseline and the consolidation of goals. 
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) identified that future 
thinking had increased from baseline if participants produced more 
concrete goals at the end of the session. The difference scores were 
calculated by subtracting the baseline measures of experience sam-
pling and goals from dots on the scatter plot represent individual sub-
jects
Table 5  Results of linear regressions exploring the relationship 
between the change in concreteness of descriptions and future think-
ing in sessions 1 and 2
B SE β t p
Goal
Constant −0.32 0.15 −2.14 0.04
Future session 1 −0.60 0.22 −0.42 −2.72 0.01
Future session 2 0.66 0.23 0.44 2.84 0.01
TV programme
Constant 0.19 0.18 1.06 0.30
Future session 1 0.41 0.33 0.28 1.21 0.23
Future session 2 −0.28 0.34 −0.19 −0.81 0.42
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thought leads to changes in the concreteness of personal 
goals, we next assessed whether these changes in concrete-
ness were predicted by individual differences in the pattern 
of hippocampal functional connectivity assessed during the 
resting state. We first verified that the overall patterns of hip-
pocampal connectivity were consistent across the two groups. 
The upper panel of Fig. 4 presents unthresholded connectiv-
ity maps for the left hippocampus seed separated into the 
participants who were subsequently allocated to the goals 
or the TV programme condition, and it is apparent that there 
were no gross differences in functional connectivity across 
the participants assigned to the two conditions. We com-
pared these groups using FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed 
Effects (FLAME) with cluster-forming threshold of Z = 2.3 
and corrected for multiple comparisons with an FWE level of 
p < .05. This analysis found no differences in the group maps 
and revealed clusters of significant functional connectivity 
within subcortical regions, in medial pre-frontal and poste-
rior cingulate cortex, lateral regions of the temporal lobe and 
elements of anterior lateral occipital cortex (see Fig. 4, lower 
panel). The significant clusters are presented in Table 6.
Having demonstrated that the experimental groups did 
not differ in their general patterns of hippocampal connec-
tivity, we conducted a group-level regression examining 
how these connectivity patterns predicted changes in con-
creteness that were common to the goals and TV condition. 
In this model, the independent variable was the components 
TV
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Fig. 4  Examination of the relationship between the resting-state con-
nectivity of the hippocampus and its relation to changes in the con-
creteness of goals. Functional connectivity from the left hippocampus 
yielded comparable patterns of connectivity across the goals and TV 
program condition (upper panel) indicating no differences in hip-
pocampal connectivity across experimental groups. Analysis of the 
group-level connectivity patterns indicated coupling between the hip-
pocampus with limbic regions, aspects of medial pre-frontal and cin-
gulate cortex and aspects of lateral temporal–occipital cortex
Table 6  Spatial cluster identified in the group-level analysis of hip-
pocampal connectivity
Region Extent p Centre of gravity
Voxels X Y Z
Positive map
Limbic 28,464 0.000 −4 −24 −15
Prefrontal 602 0.041 −1 49 −13
Negative map
Mid-cingulate 23,572 0.000 13 5 33
Cerebellum 2116 0.000 −32 −71 −38
Inferior parietal 1732 0.000 −49 −57 35
Posterior temporal (right) 733 0.017 61 −32 −15
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describing the change in concreteness. We used a cluster-
forming threshold of Z = 2.3, and the subsequent spatial 
maps were corrected for multiple comparisons with an FWE 
level of p < .05. We first explored individual differences in 
functional connectivity that varied with increases in the con-
creteness of descriptions in both conditions (i.e. an associa-
tion between changes in concreteness and functional con-
nectivity that was common to both the goals and the TV 
programme conditions). This identified a cluster in the ven-
tromedial pre-frontal cortex, centred on MNI coordinates: 8, 
35, −14, which was 5880 mm3 in volume (see Fig. 5, upper 
panel). Next, we examined individual differences in connec-
tivity that were associated with greater changes in concrete-
ness for descriptions of goals rather than TV programmes 
(i.e. specific patterns of connectivity that were greater for 
participants who increased the concreteness in their descrip-
tions of goals more than for TV programmes). This contrast 
identified a single cluster in the dorsal medial pre-frontal 
cortex extending into the pre-SMA: this was centred on 
MNI coordinates 5, 3, 64, with an approximate volume of 
4880 mm3 (see Fig. 5, upper panel).2
2
 Using the right hippocampus as a seed region, we found a similar 
pattern of increased connectivity with the medial prefrontal cortex 
associated with greater concreteness in descriptions of either TV pro-
grammes or goals. This cluster was centred on MNI coordinates 6, 35 
−4 and was approximately 4800 mm3.
To facilitate the interpretation of these patterns of con-
nectivity, we extracted the β values from both spatial clus-
ters for each participant and plotted them against their 
change in concreteness, separately for each condition. It 
can be seen in Fig. 5 that while increases in concreteness 
in both conditions were associated with greater coupling 
between the hippocampus and the cluster in the ventro-
medial pre-frontal cortex, the coupling with the pre-SMA 
cluster was associated with more concrete descriptions in 
the goal condition (r = .60, p < .001 95 % CI lower = .315, 
upper = .799] but less concrete descriptions of television 
programs (r = −.68, p < .001 95 % CI lower = −.88, 
upper = −.22). Given the relatively small sample size, 
we performed a spilt-half reliability check in both cases 
this revealed acceptable levels of consistency (Spearman–
Brown: goals = .75, TV programs = .80). Thus, our data 
show that coupling between the hippocampus and the 
ventromedial pre-frontal cortex is predictive of increased 
concreteness for both descriptions of goals and TV pro-
grammes, while an extensive cluster in the dorsomedial 
frontal cortex was uniquely associated with the tendency to 
increase the concreteness of personal goals.
Finally, to better understand the psychological signifi-
cance of this pattern of functional coupling, we conducted 
a post hoc analysis targeted at determining whether the 
pattern of functional coupling was related to less concrete 
Seed Region
-3 +30
-3
0
+3
Goals TV 
L HA – Pre SMA Coupling
-3 +30-3 +30
-3
0
+3
Goals TV 
L HA – vMPFC Connectivity
-3 +30
Common changes in Concreteness Distinct changes in Concreteness
Be
ta
Fig. 5  Relation between hippocampal connectivity and changes in 
concreteness of descriptions of goals versus TV programmes. Func-
tional connectivity between the left hippocampus and the medial 
pre-frontal cortex was a characteristic of individuals who tended to 
generally increase the level of concrete details in their descriptions 
regardless of whether they were goals or TV programmes. We also 
found that patterns of positive connectivity between the left hip-
pocampus and the pre-SMA were associated with increases in con-
creteness in the goals condition, whereas it was associated with 
reductions in concreteness in the TV program condition
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descriptions of goals in the initial session, or higher levels 
in the second session. We conducted a multiple regression 
in which the dependent variable was the hippocampal–pre-
SMA coupling and the independent variables were the 
raw ratings of abstract and concreteness in the descrip-
tions gained in the first and second sessions. We conducted 
these separately for the goal and TV programs conditions. 
In both cases, this produced a model which was signifi-
cant [goals, F (4, 22) = 4.41, p < .01; TV program, F (4, 
18) = 5.2, p < .01, see Table 7]. In the case of the descrip-
tion of goals, we found a reduction in connectivity between 
the hippocampus and the pre-SMA associated with more 
abstract goals at in session 1 and a reduction in abstraction 
in session 2. In the TV programme condition, we observed 
that the reverse connectivity between the hippocampus and 
the pre-SMA was associated with less abstraction in ses-
sion 1 and more abstraction in session 2.
Discussion
Our experiment sets out to determine the experiential and 
neural correlates of the process through which we spon-
taneously refine the steps to achieve personal goals. We 
found a reliable pattern of correlation, indicating that par-
ticipants who developed more concrete goals had engaged 
in greater spontaneous future thinking between describing 
their goals for the first time and re-describing them. That is 
future thinking did not increase as a consequence of writ-
ing about goals, it only increased for those participants who 
would subsequently produce more concrete descriptions 
of goals. Importantly, increases in concreteness were not 
associated with changes in other aspects of spontaneous 
thought, indicating that thoughts about the future were the 
precedent of more specific written descriptions of goals. 
Prior work has shown that specific plans lead to more 
effective goal achievement (Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006) 
and that more concrete goals have a protective value with 
respect to certain features of affective dysfunction (Watkins 
2008). In this context, our results are important because 
they illustrate one way in which the self-generated thoughts 
in the mind-wandering state can have adaptive qualities—
allowing our plans for the future to become better specified 
(for further discussion of the costs and benefits of mind-
wandering, see Mooneyham and Schooler 2013). The 
results, therefore, provide a mechanism that can explain 
why this style of future thinking can lead to improvements 
in mood (Ruby et al. 2013) and reductions in the physio-
logical responses to stressors (Engert et al. 2014).
Our resting-state functional MRI findings highlight that 
our capacity to develop more concrete descriptions of both 
goals and aspects of our knowledge (of TV programmes) 
is supported by brain networks centred on the hippocam-
pus. We observed stronger coupling between the hippocam-
pus and the ventromedial pre-frontal cortex in individuals 
who produced more concrete details in their descriptions 
of either TV programmes or goals. This cluster is within 
the connectivity map of the hippocampus itself, suggesting 
that together these two regions form a large-scale network 
that is generally important in embellishing information in 
memory. Our data suggest that communication between 
these regions reflects a general process through which 
explicit descriptions are made concrete, a conclusion that is 
consistent with recent evidence implicating the hippocam-
pus and the ventromedial pre-frontal cortex in contributing 
conceptual, or schematic, knowledge to episodic memo-
ries (Kumaran et al. 2009; Bonnici et al. 2012; Zeithamova 
et al. 2012; van Kesteren et al. 2013).
In contrast, greater coupling between the hippocampus 
and more dorsal medial frontal regions, including the pre-
SMA, was a specific predictor of the generation of more 
concrete goals. This may represent a mechanism that 
allows an individual to mentally simulate possible paths to 
goal achievement. The pre-SMA has a known role in plan-
ning actions (Kennerley et al. 2004), and a rostral region 
adjacent to our cluster is important in the process through 
which participants choose actions which are minimally 
constrained by the environment (Nachev et al. 2005). 
Importantly, several recent studies have extended the role 
of the pre-SMA beyond motor planning by implicating it, 
as well as the hippocampus, in the generation of detailed 
personal goals (Spreng et al. 2015) as well as in the order-
ing of future events (D’Argembeau et al. 2015). Our data 
build on these observations by illustrating the role that 
future thought during the mind-wandering state plays in 
this process. We speculate that connectivity between the 
hippocampus and the pre-SMA may be important in devis-
ing more concrete descriptions of personal goals because 
Table 7  Relation between hippocampal–pre-SMA coupling and rat-
ings of descriptions as concrete or abstract in each session
B SE β t p
Goal
Constant −3.67 2.43 −1.51 0.15
Abstract session 1 1.66 0.52 1.90 3.21 0.01
Concrete session 1 0.78 0.50 0.82 1.58 0.13
Abstract session 2 −1.16 0.46 −1.20 −2.55 0.02
Concrete session 2 −0.33 0.44 −0.30 −0.75 0.46
TV programmes
Constant −3.46 2.32 −1.49 0.16
Abstract session 1 −0.91 0.39 −0.65 −2.32 0.04
Concrete session 1 0.31 0.49 0.19 0.63 0.54
Abstract session 2 1.44 0.46 0.82 3.12 0.01
Concrete session 2 −0.10 0.47 −0.06 −0.21 0.84
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together they would support a cyclical process in which 
goal states are evaluated, refined and encoded for sub-
sequent evaluation. It is possible that the integrity of this 
cycle could depend on the role of the hippocampus in 
pattern separation since the iterative process by which 
imagined goals become more concrete requires that more 
refined goal steps are not confused with the less concrete 
goals upon which they are based. An alternative possibil-
ity is that the connectivity between the hippocampus and 
the pre-SMA reflects a state of uncertainty that is associ-
ated with reduced future thinking during session 1, as well 
as personal goals that are only weakly specified. These two 
views could be easily dissociated by a study that measures 
neural functioning online during the period when personal 
goals are consolidated. We recommend that future investi-
gations measure neural processes online during the period 
when personal goals become refined to identify the specific 
mechanism through which the hippocampus contributes to 
the consolidation of goals.
There are a number of important limitations associated 
with the current study. First, we did not record BOLD activ-
ity in the period following the initial descriptions of goals, 
and although we expect coupling between the hippocam-
pus, the vMPFC and the pre-SMA to be important during 
this period, the specific pattern of activity that occurs in the 
period when goals become more concrete remains an open 
question. Second, although our findings show a robust link 
between future thinking and more concrete personal goals, 
the smaller sample in the brain-imaging component of this 
investigation means that these data should be treated with 
caution. In particular, although the stronger coupling with 
the vMPFC was true of the entire sample, the specific cou-
pling between the hippocampus and the pre-SMA in the 
smaller goals condition means that this result has greater 
chance of being a type II error. We recommend replica-
tion of this effect with a larger sample. Third, although our 
study shows that descriptions of goals changed in tandem 
with the extent of future-related thinking, it is possible that 
other aspects of memory would change in a similar manner. 
Future work should consider whether future thinking, as 
well as other types of self-generated thought, acts to con-
cretize other aspects of experience (such as past achieve-
ments). Fourth, our control condition (TV programmes) 
varies from the personal goals on many variables. Thus, 
although our data implicate future thinking, rather than 
other aspects of experience during the mind-wandering 
state, in the process of goal consolidation, it is unclear 
which aspect of goal representation this phenomenon 
reflects (e.g. elements of the future or the prioritisation of 
aspects of task processing). Future work could compare the 
role of future thinking in the consolidation of goals with 
aspects of the future that have a less direct relationship to 
action. Finally, some of the reliability for the coding scores, 
in particular the concrete dimension, was quite low. Future 
studies should therefore explore ways of coding goal tran-
scripts which are more reliable.
Overall, our study demonstrates that the tendency to 
consider the future during mind-wandering is associated 
with the development of personal goals, making them 
more concrete even in the absence of the chance to act. 
The strength of this process was related to individual dif-
ferences in the functional connectivity of the hippocampus 
with the pre-SMA at rest, providing insights into the neu-
ral architecture that might support the transformation of 
abstract goals into more concrete plans using imagination. 
Since prospective thought is a common form of thinking 
during the mind-wandering state, these results highlight 
the important role that future thought plays in our lives by 
helping us make decisions about what to do and how to do 
it.
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